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Abstract 
Autistic adults often experience difficulties in taking the perspective of others, 
potentially undermining their social interactions.  We evaluated a quick, forced-choice version 
of the Adult Theory of Mind (A-ToM) test, which was designed to assess such difficulties and 
comprehensively evaluated by Brewer et al. (2017).  The forced-choice version (the A-ToM-
Q) demonstrated discriminant, concurrent, convergent and divergent validity using samples of 
autistic (N = 96) and non-autistic adults (N = 75).  It can be administered in a few minutes and 
machine-scored, involves minimal training and facilitates large-scale, live, or web-based 
testing.  It permits measurement of response latency and self-awareness, with response 
characteristics on both measures enhancing understanding of the nature and extent of 
perspective taking difficulties in autistic individuals. 
 
Keywords:  Autism; Theory of Mind assessment; decision latency; metacognitive monitoring  
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A Quick Measure of Theory of Mind in Autistic Adults: Decision Accuracy, Latency and 
Self-awareness 
Social interaction impairments that characterize autistic individuals are often attributed 
to difficulties in taking the perspective of others, difficulties which are thought to be reflective 
of Theory of Mind (ToM) limitations (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).  There 
has been considerable debate about issues such as whether ToM is a core mechanism 
underpinning social difficulties in autistic individuals (e.g., Stone & Gerrans, 2006; Van de 
Cruys et al., 2014), whether other mechanisms (e.g., vocal or facial emotion processing, 
attention) are the key contributors (e.g., Globerson et al., 2015; Nuske et al., 2013), what the 
biological bases of autism-related difficulties in interpreting facial expressions may be (e.g., 
Critchley et al., 2000), or whether autistic individuals are uniquely or even universally 
impaired on ToM tasks (Gernsbacher & Yergeau, 2019).  It is important to note that a host of 
other issues that are clearly relevant to a comprehensive understanding of ToM difficulties in 
autistic individuals have been canvassed, especially by those interested in more basic research 
questions about ToM.  For example, such researchers have distinguished between constructs 
such as cognitive (i.e., thinking about the thoughts and beliefs of others) and affective (i.e., 
thinking about their feelings or emotions) ToM (e.g., Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014), and 
between two distinct but complementary ToM systems that, respectively, underpin efficient 
and relatively automatic mental state inferences, and more flexible but effortful reasoning 
about mental states (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).   
Our focus is, however, on the following issue.  On tests where adult participants have to 
decode the meaning of social interactions captured on video, autistic individuals—at least at 
the group level—tend to perform less effectively than non-autistic adults (e.g., Brewer et al., 
2017; Dziobek et al., 2006; Heavey et al., 2000).  Instruments that measure such perspective 
taking difficulties provide researchers with a tool for understanding factors that may underlie 
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problematic social interactions, and for developing guidelines to improve social-
communicative skills.  For clinicians, use of such measures allows them to pinpoint specific 
difficulties that individual clients might experience when trying to understand other people’s 
social communications, and to demonstrate to clients some of the subtleties of interpersonal 
interactions that they may be missing.  Moreover, such formal measures provide the added 
benefit of being able to confirm—as highlighted by the heterogeneity in perspective taking 
abilities of autistic adults demonstrated by Brewer et al. (2017)—that some adults are unlikely 
to be experiencing difficulties in these areas.  
Yet, many existing instruments are cumbersome in terms of administration, scoring, and 
the training thereof, thereby limiting their usefulness.  Here we demonstrate that by 
substituting a forced-choice response format for the free-report format of the Adult Theory of 
Mind (A-ToM) test (Brewer et al., 2017)—a test subjected to a comprehensive psychometric 
evaluation with a large sample of autistic adults—an efficient measure from training, 
administration, and scoring perspectives is created.  This forced-choice measure enables 
recording of response latency, confidence and decision accuracy, providing a nuanced picture 
of perspective taking difficulties.  
Measuring Perspective Taking in Adults with ASD 
Numerous measures designed to identify adults’ mental state inferences when observing 
people interacting in realistic everyday social situations have been developed (e.g., Brewer et 
al., 2017; Dziobek et al., 2006; Heavey et al., 2000).  They have primarily investigated the 
nature of autism-related difficulties, with the associated measurement foci and the resulting 
sample sizes not geared towards formal psychometric evaluations.  The Adult Theory of Mind 
or A-ToM (Brewer et al., 2017)—an adaptation and substantial extension of the Strange 
Stories test (Happé, 1999)—was, however, designed as a formal assessment tool.  Its 
evaluation targeted sample sizes that permitted a systematic psychometric evaluation, 
A quick measure of Theory of Mind 
6 
encompassing item analysis, reliability assessment, and examinations of the instrument’s 
factor structure, concurrent, divergent and discriminant validity.  That evaluation identified 
six social, or perspective taking, items (e.g., interpreting elements such as sarcasm, faux pas, 
white lie, bluff, and misunderstanding) that differentiated autistic and non-autistic individuals, 
and six physical or control items that were less sensitive to autistic characteristics, with the 
required cognitions not involving social or perspective taking inferences).   
Brewer et al. (2017) showed that the A-ToM was characterized by sound inter-rater and 
test-retest reliability. Its factor structure reflected social and physical dimensions, with autistic 
and non-autistic participants more strongly differentiated on the social than the physical scale.  
Unsurprisingly, given the heterogeneous nature of autism, and despite the significant group 
differences on the A-ToM’s social scale, inter-individual variability was marked, with some 
overlap between the performance of autistic and non-autistic individuals.  Concurrent validity 
was evidenced by correlations with the corresponding sub-scales of two widely used ToM 
measures: the Strange Stories test (Happé, 1999) and the Frith-Happé animations (White et 
al., 2011).  Subsequently, researchers have demonstrated criterion-related validity through 
correlations of autistic adults’ A-ToM social performance with measures of their social–
behavioral skills and interpersonal relationships (Brewer et al., 2019), and with their ability to 
extricate themselves from situations in which they were erroneously suspected of involvement 
in a crime (Young & Brewer, 2020), thereby highlighting the likely critical contributions of 
perspective taking difficulties to adaptive social functioning.  Divergent validity was 
illustrated by correlations with the perspective taking and empathic concern sub-scales of the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index’s (IRI; Davis, 1983), but not the IRI’s personal distress sub-
scale or a measure of social anxiety, the mini-SPIN (Connor et al., 2001), despite the latter 
two measures clearly differentiating autistic and non-autistic individuals. 
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Although the A-ToM is a promising measure for researchers and clinicians exploring 
the limitations imposed by adults’ perspective taking difficulties in day-to-day social 
functioning, it lacks some features that would make it more useful.  As Livingston et al. 
(2019) argued, key issues for users are training requirements and administration time, scoring 
complexity and time, and the potential for web-based administration and automated scoring, 
factors that would make assessment more accessible and facilitate large-scale data collection. 
Administration time for the A-ToM is 15-20 minutes.  Administrators require training and 
practice to ensure reliable coding of responses. Training of each coder takes approximately 1 
hour, and coding of all items by experienced personnel takes 15-20 minutes.  Because A-ToM 
responses are provided by free report, measures of response latency are confounded by 
individual differences in factors such as motor proficiency and expressive ability.  Yet, as 
Livingston et al. (2019) highlighted, response latency is potentially informative, not only 
about processing difficulties but also about responsiveness to clinical interventions.  In many 
live interpersonal interactions, individuals often do not have the opportunity to reflect (at least 
for very long) on the meaning of or intentions behind another individual’s verbal and 
nonverbal communications (cf. Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).  Thus, the speed with which an 
individual grasps the perspective of others and responds appropriately will often be the key to 
adaptive and appropriate social interactions. 
The current study was designed to overcome the limitations of the A-ToM, without 
modifying test content.  We substituted a forced-choice response format for the free-report of 
the A-ToM, thereby producing the quick form of the A-ToM, labeled the A-ToM-Q.  Each 
item was accompanied by four multiple-choice alternative responses (one of which was the 
correct answer), with these alternatives taken directly from the A-ToM’s coding protocols as 
described in Brewer et al. (2017).  To obtain a response latency measure, participants received 
a standard processing speed task instruction: respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.   
A quick measure of Theory of Mind 
8 
We also examined participants’ self-awareness of their perspective taking strengths 
and limitations by obtaining a confidence measure for each response.  Being aware of one’s 
capabilities in reading the intentions or perspective of others—referred to as metacognitive 
monitoring—should increase the likelihood that the individual will respond in a socially 
appropriate manner during interpersonal interactions and allow them to identify possible areas 
for improvement (Kelly & Metcalfe, 2011).  Self-awareness is indicated if the individual’s 
confidence and accuracy in their perspective taking responses are meaningfully related.  A 
common approach to assessing this relationship is to calculate a point-biserial correlation, 
with confidence (expressed on a scale such as 0%, 10%, …, 100%) correlated with a binary 
accuracy outcome (correct, incorrect).  Although the point-biserial correlation reveals how 
well confidence discriminates correct and incorrect decisions, it is now well established that a 
weak point-biserial correlation may conceal meaningful relationships (for detail, see Brewer 
& Wells, 2006; Juslin et al., 1996).  A more informative assessment of the relationship 
involves using a calibration approach which charts the relationship between subjective and 
objective probabilities of accuracy by systematically plotting accuracy against each level of 
confidence (e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006; Juslin et al., 1996).  If an individual’s confidence 
and accuracy in their perspective taking responses are well calibrated, accuracy should 
increase systematically with increases in confidence.  Thus, perfect calibration is evident if 
the obtained calibration curve is linear: that is, all decisions made with 100% confidence were 
accurate, 90% of responses made with 90% confidence were accurate, and so on.  In other 
words, the calibration approach indicates the likely accuracy of decisions made with particular 
levels of confidence, and can speak to the individual’s awareness of the accuracy of their own 
perspective taking judgments, thus indicating whether their judgments are characterized by 
over- or underconfidence. 
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We expected autistic and non-autistic individuals to be more strongly differentiated on 
the A-ToM-Q’s social (i.e., perspective taking) scale than its physical scale.  We also 
expected significant correlations between the social sub-scale and extant ToM scales, 
including the Strange Stories tests’ social scale (Happé, 1999) and the feelings categorization 
and mental scales of the Frith-Happé animations (White et al., 2011).  Although we expected 
autistic and non-autistic participants to differ on self-report measures of perspective taking, 
empathic concern, personal distress and social anxiety, we only expected the perspective 
taking and empathic concern measures to correlate with the A-ToM-Q social sub-scale. 
Latency patterns were difficult to predict given we were unable to control individuals’ 
speed-accuracy operating characteristics, despite instructions emphasizing both speed and 
accuracy.  One possibility is suggested by research showing that, unlike non-autistic 
individuals who show a predisposition towards an intuitive style of decision making, autistic 
individuals and individuals with more autistic traits may be predisposed towards deliberative 
or effortful processing (e.g., Brosnan et al., 2016, 2017).  Consistent with this view is Miu et 
al.’s (2012) finding of longer response times on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a) for (neurotypical) individuals high on autistic traits (cf. those 
with low autistic traits) as measured by the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001b). Under forced choice responding such response patterns would lead to longer 
response latencies for the ASD group, possibly regardless of any group differences in 
accuracy.  Another logical, though unlikely, possibility is that poorer social scale performance 
by autistic individuals would reflect careless responding, with autistic individuals responding 
as rapidly as or even faster than non-autistic individuals. 
Possible group differences in self-awareness were also difficult to forecast.  
Investigations of metacognitive monitoring in autistic and non-autistic samples in several 
different task domains have been reported, with mixed findings.  For example, poorer 
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metacognitive monitoring by autistic individuals has been reported on general knowledge and 
mathematics tasks (Brosnan et al., 2016; Grainger et al., 2016) but not on an episodic memory 
task (Maras et al., 2020).  On a facial emotion recognition task, perhaps the closest 
approximation to a perspective taking task, Sawyer et al. (2014) reported comparable 
discrimination between confidence for correct and incorrect responses for autistic and non-
autistic samples.  However, contrasting average confidence for correct and incorrect responses 
only taps one aspect of the confidence-accuracy relationship and provides no guide as to the 
sensitivity of individuals’ adjustments in confidence in response to the range of possible 
variations in accuracy.  The latter information is provided by the confidence-accuracy 
calibration approach that has been widely used in different decision-making domains (e.g., 
Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; Brewer & Wells, 2006; Maras et al., 2020): the essence of this 
approach is to track accuracy variations across the range of possible confidence judgments. 
Here, autistic and non-autistic adults completed the A-ToM-Q, with the key dependent 
measures being response accuracy, latency, and confidence for social and physical items.  
Relationships with existing ToM scales (the Strange Stories and Frith-Happé animations) 
indexed concurrent validity.  Other measures likely to reflect ToM (the IRI’s perspective 
taking and empathic concern scales) were used to assess convergent validity, while two 
measures (the IRI’s personal distress scale and the mini-SPIN social anxiety scale) expected 
to differentiate the two samples, independent of ToM, were used to assess divergent validity. 
Method 
Participants 
The autistic sample was recruited from two sources with the aim of securing 
approximately 100 adults with verbal abilities likely to exclude the possibility of an 
intellectual disability. Thirty-two adults (12 female) diagnosed with Asperger syndrome (AS) 
or ASD and registered on an Australian university research participation database comprised 
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one source.  They were aged from 20 to 64 years (M = 33.4, SD = 14.0).  Verbal 
Comprehension Index (VCI) and Full-Scale IQ (FSIQ) scores on the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence-Second Edition (WASI-II; Wechsler, 2011) ranged from 85-149 (M = 
104.3, SD = 13.7, 95% CI [99.5, 109.2]) and 85-146 (M = 105.5, SD = 14.1, 95% CI [100.6, 
110.5], respectively.  Participants met DSM-IV-TR [APA, 2000] or DSM-5 [APA, 2013] 
criteria, and had been diagnosed by two qualified diagnosticians or a psychologist endorsed 
by the local autism service delivery agency.  One individual completed all measures but was 
excluded because their WASI-II VCI was below 85.  Participants received an honorarium for 
participation. 
Another 74 individuals were recruited via a UK university autism research database and 
social media and completed all measures using the Qualtrics platform.  Autism diagnoses 
were ascertained by asking participants to provide detailed information about their diagnosis, 
including confirmation of a formal diagnosis by a qualified clinical professional, and details 
regarding the diagnosis type (e.g., autism, ASD, ASC, Asperger Syndrome, etc.), age at 
diagnosis, diagnosis date and location, and the diagnostician.  WASI-II administration was 
not possible using the online delivery.  Instead, verbal comprehension was measured using 
Part 1 of the Advanced Vocabulary Test I-V-4 (AVT) from Educational Testing Services’ Kit 
of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom et al., 1976).  Participants (N=3) scoring more 
than two standard deviations below the normative sample mean were excluded.  A detailed 
comparison of all dependent measures obtained from the two ASD sub-samples is presented 
in the Results section.  Six other individuals completed the assessments but were excluded 
due to audio failures during A-ToM-Q presentation or because the participant participated 
twice.  The final online sample comprised 65 individuals (43 female) aged 18 to 60 years (M 
= 35.5, SD = 12.3).  AVT scores ranged from 4.25 to 18 (M = 10.4, SD = 3.3, 95% CI [9.59, 
11.2]).  The AQ-10 (Autism Spectrum Quotient; Allison et al., 2012) profile of the online 
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sample was consistent with the presence of autistic characteristics (M = 7.97, SD = 1.98, 95% 
CI [7.49, 8.45]).  Thus, overall, the autistic sample comprised 96 individuals, aged 18 to 64 
years (M = 34.8, SD = 12.9). 
The non-autistic sample comprised 81 individuals, mostly students enrolled in 
undergraduate programs or programs designed to facilitate transition to university study for 
mature-aged students.  Five individuals were excluded because their WASI-II VCI was less 
than 85; and one individual was excluded for scoring 6 or higher on the AQ-10, suggesting 
grounds for a diagnostic assessment for ASD (Allison et al., 2012).  The final sample included 
75 non-autistic individuals (56 female) whose ages ranged from 17 to 50 years (M = 22.4, SD 
= 6.8).  WASI-II VCI and FSIQ scores ranged from 86-126 (M = 104.9, SD = 9.0, 95% CI 
[102.8, 107.0]) and 83-130 (M = 105.4, SD = 10.8, 95% CI [102.9, 107.8]), respectively.  
Their AQ-10 scores were markedly lower than those of the online ASD sub-sample, (M = 
2.40, SD = 1.63, 95% CI [2.03, 2.78] vs. M = 7.97, SD = 1.98, 95% CI [7.49, 8.45]). 
Materials 
A-ToM-Q.  The A-ToM-Q used the six social and six physical stimulus items from the 
final scale of the A-ToM (Brewer et al., 2017).  Each scenario was scripted, acted, and filmed 
to produce a professional quality set of digital video stimuli.  The scenarios ranged in duration 
from 14s to 108s.  (During the manuscript review process copies of the stimuli may be viewed 
at the URLs below.  Two examples of social item video scripts are presented in the Appendix.  
Following publication, bona fide researchers and clinicians will be able to access the stimuli 
free-of-charge from a site managed by the researchers.) 
Social Playlist Link: 
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLJCW1evzKKctzHvYfB1RADd27m8IBaWcu 
Physical Playlist Link: 
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLJCW1evzKKcuy1rGu3Ocatm97s_KpdhyI 
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The order of item presentation was randomized.  Each item was followed by four 
forced-choice alternative response options; the four alternatives for each question were 
randomly ordered and the resulting order was used for all participants.  Participants were 
instructed to select one of the forced-choice options as quickly and accurately as possible.   
We used specific examples from the original A-ToM’s scoring protocols (Brewer et al., 
2017) to produce the four response alternatives for each item: one alternative matched the 
correct response, one or two alternatives matched responses coded as partially correct, and 
one or two matched incorrect responses.  The partially correct response options were included 
among the four alternatives to ensure challenging discriminations, not for scoring purposes 
(see below).  Whether one or two partially correct or incorrect alternatives were used for each 
item was based on the number of clear exemplars in the A-ToM’s coding guidelines that 
could be translated directly into a multiple-choice response option.  The alternatives and 
scoring protocols for all items appear in Supplemental Materials Table S1.   
Answers were scored 0 (incorrect) or 1 (correct), with possible scores on each sub-scale 
ranging from 0 to 6.  The A-ToM’s scoring protocol (Brewer et al., 2017) was 0 (incorrect), 1 
(partially correct) and 2 (correct).  However, with only four alternatives per item for the A-
ToM-Q’s forced-choice version, assigning points to partially correct alternatives for each item 
meant that participants could score a point by selecting any of 2 or, for some items, 3 of the 
response options, thereby potentially inflating accuracy scores by chance.  Accordingly, 
although partially correct alternatives were retained in the forced-choice options to ensure 
challenging discriminations, responses scored partially correct using the original A-ToM’s 
scoring protocols received 0 on the multiple-choice version.  Item-total correlations ranged 
from .29 to .46 for social items and .00 to .27 for physical items (coefficient alpha is not 
reported due to the widely reported concerns about its interpretation; e.g., McNeish, 2018).  
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Response latency for each item was recorded from the appearance of the multiple-
choice alternatives to the participant’s mouse click on their chosen alternative.  Following 
each response, participants rated their confidence in their answer from 0 (absolutely 
uncertain) to 100% (absolutely certain), on an 11-point decile scale. 
Verbal ability.  The WASI-II comprises Vocabulary, Similarities, Block Design, and 
Matrix Reasoning subtests, with the Vocabulary and Similarities subtests making up the 
Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI).  The Advanced Vocabulary Test I-V-4 (AVT) from 
Educational Testing Services’ Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom et al., 
1976) comprises 18 items that assess knowledge of word meanings, completed within a 4-
minute time limit. On each item, participants are presented with a word and asked to select its 
synonym from five options. Participants’ scores on the test are the number of items answered 
correctly minus a fraction of the number of items answered incorrectly (participants may opt 
not to answer items if they are uncertain). Scores on this measure can therefore range from -
4.5 to 18, with higher scores indicating higher levels of verbal comprehension.  
Concurrent validity measures.  The measures were the Strange Stories test (Happé, 
1999) and the Frith-Happé animations (White et al., 2011).  The Strange Stories test 
comprised 16 scenarios or stories (8 social, 8 physical) for which the examinee provides a 
non-literal, free-report interpretation of the meaning of scenario characters’ expressions.  The 
second concurrent validity measure was White et al.’s (2011) modification of Frith and 
Happé’s (Abell et al., 2000) animations of two triangles moving around on the screen either 
randomly or apparently in some kind of response to each other.  Participants viewed 14 videos 
in total: 2 (practice trial) videos, 4 ToM (i.e., social or mental) videos, 4 goal-directed 
(physical) videos, and 4 random videos. After each video participants were asked to indicate 
whether the behavior displayed by the triangles involved a mental (i.e., social) interaction, a 
purely physical interaction or no interaction.  Whenever they correctly identified a mental 
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interaction, they then selected the word from a list that best described how each of the 
triangles were feeling at the end of the video.  These responses gave rise to a feelings 
categorization score.  White et al. (2011) reported that, compared with non-autistic controls, 
autistic adults performed more poorly at recognizing mental state interactions and had lower 
feelings categorization scores. 
Convergent and divergent validity measures.  Two convergent measures were 
provided by self-report social-behavioral skills’ (18 items) and interpersonal relationships’ 
(13 items) questionnaires, reflecting varied aspects of the individual’s adult relationships.  In 
a sample of autistic individuals, Brewer et al. (2019) reported that ToM (measured by the A-
ToM) was significantly related to both measures (r = .35 and .64). 
Other measures were provided by three sub-scales of the IRI (Davis, 1983).  Each scale 
comprises seven items probing the extent to which individuals reported (a) taking the 
psychological perspective of others, (b) showing empathic concern for others in difficulty, 
and (c) feeling personal distress in tense interpersonal settings.  The final measure was the 
Mini-SPIN, a three item, self-report screener for generalized social anxiety disorder (Connor 
et al., 2001).  All measures were expected to distinguish autistic and non-autistic individuals, 
but significant correlations were not expected between the A-ToM-Q social scale and the 
divergent measures of personal distress and anxiety disorder. 
Procedure  
Participants received details of what was required, read a study information sheet, and 
gave informed consent.  Online participants confirmed that they were using a laptop device or 
similar, answered two questions designed to exclude bots, and responded to screening 
questions ensuring normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing, and no history of major 
psychiatric, or neurocognitive disorders.  They then provided details of their age, gender, 
native language, and ASD diagnosis.  For all participants, tests were administered in the 
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following order: A-ToM-Q (item order random), AQ-10, Mini-SPIN, IRI, AVT (or WASI-II), 
Social and Behavioral Skills, Interpersonal Skills, Frith-Happé animations, and Strange 
Stories (physical and social items counterbalanced).  We administered tests in this order 
(rather than counterbalancing) to ensure optimal attention for the key A-ToM-Q measure, 
which was separated as much as possible from the other ToM measure (i.e., the Strange 
Stories test).  Testing took place at the university or online (UK ASD sub-sample).  
Participants were told to expect the tasks to take at least two hours to complete and they could 
take breaks when needed during the session.  The study received ethical approval from the 
appropriate ethics review committee at each institution. 
Results 
Comparison of Autistic Sub-Samples 
We compared the UK and Australian sub-samples of autistic individuals on all 
measures obtained from both samples to alleviate concerns about combining them.  
Significant group differences were only detected on the IRI’s self-report perspective taking 
scale, t (94) = 2.28, p = .025, d = 0.50, 95% CI [0.06, 0.93], and the Mini-Spin, t (94) = 2.09, 
p = .039, d = 0.46, 95% CI [0.03, 0.89]; the UK sample scored lower on perspective taking 
and higher on social anxiety than the Australian sample.  As the sub-samples did not differ 
significantly on the A-ToM-Q, the Strange Stories test, the Frith-Happé animations, or the 
convergent and divergent validity measures, the two sub-samples were combined. 
Validity 
Discriminant validity.  A-ToM-Q social sub-scale performance was significantly lower 
for the autistic (M = 4.24, SD = 1.65, 95% CI [3.91, 4.57]) than the non-autistic sample (M = 
5.27, SD = 0.81, 95% CI [5.09, 5.45]), t (144.91) = 5.23, p < .001, d = 0.76, CI [0.45, 1.07].  
A-ToM-Q physical performance was also significantly lower for the autistic (M = 3.64, SD = 
1.33, 95% CI [3.37, 3.91]) than the non-autistic sample (M = 4.25, SD = 1.21, 95% CI [3.98, 
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4.52]), t (169) = 3.14, p = .002, d = 0.47, CI [0.16, 0.78].1  However, the magnitude of the 
difference between the two groups for the social scale was larger, with the effect size index 
approaching large for the social measure compared with weak-moderate for the physical 
measure. 
It is unlikely that the A-ToM-Q social group difference was IQ-related.  For the autistic 
and non-autistic individuals tested with the WASI-II, correlations between the social score 
and VCI (r = .07) and FSIQ (r = .01) were negligible.  In contrast, significant moderate 
correlations were detected between the physical score and both VCI (r = .29) and FSIQ (r = 
.32).  A one-way ANCOVA on the A-ToM-Q social scores for the autistic and non-autistic 
sub-groups, with VCI as the covariate, confirmed the significant effect of group, F (1, 103) = 
9.94, p = .002, ηp
2 = .09.  In contrast, an identical analysis on the A-ToM-Q physical scores 
revealed that the significant effect of group disappeared after controlling for VCI, F (1, 103) 
=2.53, p = .12, ηp
2 = .02.  For those autistic individuals who completed the AVT verbal ability 
measure, correlations between the A-ToM-Q social and physical scores and the AVT were 
also weak (r = .08 and .13, respectively) and non-significant.  Although not all autistic 
participants completed the WASI-II, these data patterns indicate that not only did the A-ToM-
Q social scale differentiate the two groups more clearly than the physical scale, but also that 
performance on the social (though not the physical) scale was independent of verbal ability.  
Concurrent validity.  As expected, significant positive correlations were detected 
between (a) the A-ToM-Q social scale and both the Strange Stories social sub-scale (r = .45, p 
< .01) and the Frith-Happé animations’ mental and feelings categorization scales (rs = .17, p 
< .05, and .28, p < .01. respectively), and (b) the A-ToM-Q physical scale and the Strange 
Stories physical scale (r = .37, p < .01).  Supplemental Materials Table S2 provides the 
 
1 For both groups, correlations between age and A-ToM-Q performance were negligible on both the social, r = 
.07 and -.10 for autistic and non-autistic samples respectively, and physical sub-scales, r = .04 and -.08 for 
autistic and non-autistic samples respectively.  Note also that Pearson r coefficients are reported throughout; 
however, the pattern and magnitude of non-parametric coefficients are very similar. 
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complete inter-correlation matrix.  Descriptive statistics for the two groups on the Strange 
Stories and Frith-Happé animations sub-scales are provided in Supplemental Materials Table 
S3.  For the Strange Stories, the effect size indices reveal that the differentiation between 
autistic and non-autistic adults was more pronounced for physical than social items, the 
opposite of the expected pattern.  The two groups were significantly differentiated on the 
Frith-Happé animations’ mental and feelings categorization measures, but with relatively 
weak effect sizes, similar to those reported by Brewer et al. (2017) for the A-ToM. 
Convergent and divergent validity.  As expected, autistic participants scored more 
poorly than non-autistic participants on both the social-behavioral skills and the interpersonal 
relationships measure (see Supplemental Materials Table S3), with both measures correlating 
significantly with the A-ToM-Q social score, r = .35 and .30, ps < .01, respectively.  The A-
ToM-Q social score also correlated significantly with the IRI’s perspective taking, r = .27, 
and empathic concern sub-scales, r = .25, ps < .01, although the autistic sample only differed 
significantly from the non-autistic sample on the former sub-scale (see Supplemental 
Materials Table S3).  Finally, evidence for divergent validity was provided by the findings 
that although the autistic sample scored markedly higher than the non-autistic sample on both 
the IRI personal distress sub-scale and the Mini-SPIN social anxiety scale (see Supplemental 
Materials Table S3), neither measure correlated meaningfully with the A-ToM-Q social sub-
scale, rs  = -.01 and -.15, respectively, ps > .05. 
Decision Latency 
Our presentation of the decision latency data was guided by several objectives.  One 
was to provide detailed descriptive data by test item for each group to provide something akin 
to a preliminary normative reference base to assist interpretation of test responding. A second 
objective was to explore group differences in speed-accuracy operating characteristics.  For 
example, when the decision latency and social scale accuracy data are considered together, 
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might they point to group differences in (a) the tendency to favor deliberative or intuitive 
processing, reflected in decision latency differences regardless of accuracy, (b) response 
caution, perhaps with speed of responding sacrificed for accuracy (or vice versa) (c) the time 
needed to achieve equivalent levels of accuracy, or (d) perhaps a combination of some 
fundamental limitation affecting accuracy and a tendency to favor either deliberative or 
intuitive processing?  A third objective was to compute a composite latency measure that 
facilitated examination of the relationship between ToM and decision latency. 
Given the unsurprising inter-item variations in both latency and the number of correct 
and incorrect responses, our primary focus was a descriptive examination of patterns that 
were consistent across items.  Descriptive latency statistics for each group are presented in 
Table 1.  Any outliers (identified using z = ±3.29) were first assigned the next most extreme 
value ±1 unit of measurement (0.01 s).  Three noteworthy patterns emerged.  First, as shown 
in Table 1, both groups’ latencies for correct decisions were generally shorter than those for 
incorrect decisions, a pattern that response latency researchers have argued indicates that 
incorrect decisions more likely reflect difficult discriminations than careless responding (cf. 
Brewer & Smith, 1984, 1989).  Second, for correct decisions, latencies for the autistic sample 
were significantly longer than those for non-autistic individuals, with the exception of just one 
physical item (lightbulb) for which the difference was much smaller (see Table 2a for 
inferential contrasts and associated effect sizes for each item).  Third, for incorrect decisions, 
the effect size indices reveal that the group differences in latency were less pronounced than 
for correct decisions for 6 (3 social, 3 physical) of the 12 items (see Table 2a) although, for 5 
of the 12 items, incorrect response latencies for non-autistic individuals are based on too few 
responses (e.g., 1-10) to provide stable estimates.   
Given the different age ranges and mean age for the two groups, and the likelihood of 
age effects on decision latency (cf. Smith & Brewer, 1995), we examined the relationship 
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between age and decision latency for correct A-ToM-Q social responses using a composite 
latency measure for each participant.  As decision latency varied markedly across scenarios, 
we first translated each individual’s latency for each item into a standard score on that item.  
Next, to check whether individuals’ response latencies across items were reasonably 
consistent—for example, fast (slow) individuals were generally fast (slow) across items—we 
examined the inter-correlations between the combined autistic and non-autistic samples’ 
standard scores for each item.  All correlations between the A-ToM-Q social items were 
statistically significant and mostly in the .4 - .5 range (see Supplemental Materials Table S4).  
Accordingly, we computed an average z-score for each participant to use as a composite 
latency measure for correct responses.  Decision latency was positively correlated with age in 
both the autistic group, r = .27, p = < .01, and the non-autistic group, r = .28, p = .02.  We 
then re-examined decision latency differences between the groups.  Table 2b shows the 
adjusted mean latencies for the social items—the items of primary interest—for the two 
groups, and the inferential contrasts of latencies for the two groups with age controlled.  
Although the group latency differences remained across items, the effect sizes were reduced. 
The composite latency score was also used to examine the relationship between ToM 
and decision latency.  With age controlled, there was a significant negative correlation 
between A-ToM-Q social performance and latency, r = -.25, p < .001.  Further, a one-way 
ANCOVA comparing social scores for the autistic and non-autistic groups, after controlling 
for both decision latency and age, confirmed the main effect for group, F (1, 166) = 7.64, p = 
< .01, d = 0.43, with autistic individuals (adjusted M = 4.83, SE = 0.15) performing more 
poorly than non-autistic individuals (adjusted M = 5.09, SE = 0.18) on the A-ToM-Q social 
scale, independent of time taken to record their decision. 
Heterogeneity of the ASD Sample 
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Despite the significant effect of group on A-ToM-Q social performance, the data 
patterns are not consistent with the position that perspective taking difficulties in autistic 
individuals are ubiquitous.  The distribution of scores on the social and physical sub-scales for 
the two groups is shown in Table 3.  Fewer autistic than non-autistic individuals scored 5 or 6 
on the social sub-scale and very low scores (≤ 3) were more prevalent among autistic 
individuals.  As expected, these patterns were not as pronounced on the physical sub-scale.  
The latency data, however, paint a different picture.  For economy of presentation, we 
only show the age-adjusted latency patterns for those scoring 5 or 6 on the social sub-scale 
(see Table 4).  Comparison of the descriptive and inferential statistics in Table 4 with the age-
adjusted patterns for the full samples shown in Table 2b reveal that, even when the autistic 
individuals performed with high accuracy, decision latencies were still significantly longer 
than those for non-autistic individuals on four of the six scenarios.  Note, however, that for 
two of those four scenarios, the effect sizes were suggestive of relatively weak effects.   
Self-Awareness 
To examine participants’ monitoring of their decision-making accuracy, we plotted 
decision accuracy against confidence (recorded immediately after the decision) to produce a 
calibration curve for each group.  As participants only completed 6 items on each of the social 
and physical scales, the calculation of individual calibration statistics was impractical.  The 
calibration curves indicated the proportion of accurate decisions (with every item’s response 
contributing a separate data point) at each confidence level from 0 to 100%.  To maximize the 
stability of estimates, confidence categories were collapsed into five categories (0–20%, 30–
40%, 50–60%, 70–80%, 90–100%), with the proportion correct in each plotted against the 
weighted mean confidence for that category.  Figure 1 shows the calibration curves for the 
two groups for A-ToM-Q social (upper panel) and physical (lower panel) sub-scales.   
A quick measure of Theory of Mind 
22 
For the A-ToM social scale, accuracy for both groups was high at the 90-100% 
confidence level and declined (following the ideal calibration line) as confidence fell.  (The 
two lowest confidence plot points for each group rely on too few observations to be 
meaningfully interpreted.)  However, although confidence and accuracy were calibrated for 
both groups, there were clear differences.  The non-autistic participants were perfectly 
calibrated at the highest confidence level and thereafter their curve was characterized by slight 
under-confidence: that is, proportion correct was a little higher than the associated confidence 
level.  In contrast, the autistic participants’ curve was characterized by overconfidence: for 
example, only around 80% of decisions made with 90-100% confidence were accurate, only 
around 60% of decisions made with 70-80% confidence were accurate, and so on.  Thus, as 
well as being less accurate and slower on social items than non-autistic participants, the 
autistic participants’ confidence judgments did not reflect the same degree of awareness of 
lapses in accuracy.  For the physical items, both groups were characterized by overconfidence 
in the upper section of the curves (i.e., 70-80% confidence and above).  
Interestingly, the curves for autistic individuals on the social scale suggested no 
meaningful differences between fast and slow decision makers.  The sample was split into fast 
and slow responders based on each individual’s average z-score across items, with separate 
calibration curves produced for each (see Supplemental Materials Figure S1).  Where there 
were sufficient observations to produce stable estimates (i.e., the curve’s upper section), the 
curves were almost identical, suggesting similar self-awareness in fast and slow responders.  
In contrast, slow responders were characterized by overconfidence on the physical scale. 
Note, however, that despite the calibration curves providing evidence of greater 
overconfidence in the autistic participants, they were not more confident overall.  A 2 (group: 
autistic, non-autistic) × 2 (sub-scale: social, physical) mixed ANOVA on median confidence 
for the 6 items revealed a weak but significant effect of group, F (1, 169) = 3.95, p < .05, ηp
2 
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= .02, and a significant effect of sub-scale, F (1, 169) = 91.70, p < .001, ηp
2 = .35.  Autistic 
individuals were actually less confident (M = 83.44, SD = 14.06 and M = 73.96, SD = 17.03 
for both social and physical items, respectively) than non-autistic participants (M = 86.73, SD 
= 12.91 and M = 78.80, SD = 13.15, respectively).  The lower confidence for autistic 
participants on both sub-scales is consistent with their significantly longer response latencies. 
Finally, for participants from the two groups who scored 5 or 6 on the social scale, there 
were no meaningful group differences between the social or the physical curves (see 
Supplemental Materials Figure S2).  The social scale curve was characterized by perfect 
calibration at the highest confidence levels, and considerable underconfidence at lower levels.  
The physical scale curve indicated overconfidence at the maximum confidence levels, but 
close to perfect calibration at lower levels.  
Discussion 
This study makes two main contributions.  First, it indicates the A-ToM-Q is a 
promising and efficient measure of perspective taking in autistic adults for use with either in-
person or online administration.  Second, it contributes to our understanding of the nature and 
extent of perspective taking difficulties that may characterize autistic adults.  We address each 
of these contributions, followed by consideration of limitations and issues for future research. 
First, we consider the measure itself.  As with the A-ToM (Brewer et al., 2017), 
performance on the A-ToM-Q demonstrated concurrent validity with other adult ToM 
measures.  Convergent and divergent validity were suggested by meaningful relationships 
with performance accuracy on measures that are considered to be underpinned by perspective 
taking ability, and the absence of such relationships with measures that clearly differentiated 
autistic from non-autistic adults but do not depend on perspective taking ability. 
Discriminant validity was indicated by stronger differentiation of autistic and non-
autistic samples on social (i.e., perspective taking) than physical scale performance accuracy.  
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Moreover, social, but not physical, performance accuracy was unrelated to verbal ability, and 
controlling for verbal IQ (using participants who completed the WASI-II) removed the group 
difference on the physical but not the social sub-scale.  In contrast, the two samples were (a) 
not more strongly differentiated on the social than the physical scale of the Strange Stories 
test, with those scales correlating significantly with verbal IQ, and (b) not as clearly 
differentiated on either the Frith- Happé animations social or feelings categorization scales. 
From an administration perspective, the A-ToM-Q offers significant advantages over 
the A-ToM.  First, the latency data indicate that the time required to complete the social 
scale—the scale of interest for researchers seeking a predictive perspective taking measure 
and for clinicians interested in understanding factors contributing to social-communicative 
difficulties—will be between 5 and 8 minutes for a substantial proportion of autistic adults.  
Scoring, whether manual or electronic, will incur negligible time demands.  Moreover, no 
training in scoring will be required, nor will there be concerns about the reliability of scoring 
across test administrators.  Thus, the potential for web-based administration for clinicians and 
researchers, together with that for large-scale data collection, is substantial. 
The study’s second major contribution is the understanding that different aspects of our 
data provide regarding the nature and extent of perspective taking difficulties in autistic 
adults.  First, as found with the A-ToM, variability in perspective taking across autistic 
individuals was substantial.  Reiterating Brewer et al.’s (2017) conclusion, a deficit in 
perspective taking or ToM may suggest autism in adults but is not a requirement to meet 
diagnostic criteria.  This conclusion has implications, of course, for the perspective that a 
ToM deficit is a core feature of the condition, a topic that more recently has also been taken 
up by other researchers (e.g., Astle & Fletcher-Watson, 2020; Gernsbacher & Yergeau, 2019). 
The second informative feature of our findings is provided by the response latency data.  
Autistic individuals were significantly slower than non-autistic individuals across the various 
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test items.  Controlling for age—with decision latency longer for older participants—reduced 
but did not eliminate group latency differences.  The latency patterns are not consistent with 
the possibility that poorer perspective taking performance reflected careless or impulsive 
responding (i.e., sacrificing accuracy for speed of responding).  They are, however, consistent 
with the perspective that autistic individuals are predisposed towards deliberative, slower and 
more effortful “Type 2’ processing, whereas typically developing individuals are predisposed 
towards a more rapid, effortless and intuitive (“Type 1’) style of decision making (Brosnan et 
al., 2016, 2017).  Thus, the latency data could reflect a tendency for autistic individuals to 
analyze meticulously the various response options before responding.  Note, however, that 
doing so did not eliminate the performance differential between the groups, with the 
significant group difference persisting with the composite latency measure controlled.  Our 
data do not, however, permit any conclusion about whether any apparent predisposition 
towards deliberate or effortful processing reflects something akin to a ‘fixed’—analogous to 
an automatic or unconscious cognition—versus an adjustable or strategic (i.e., a conscious or 
controlled) limitation. 
We examined whether further insight into these possibilities might be provided by a 
comparative examination of those autistic and non-autistic individuals who achieved high 
levels of accuracy on the social sub-scale.  Despite those two sub-samples performing with 
similar accuracy, the autistic individuals remained slower than the non-autistic individuals, 
even after controlling for age.  Again, these data are consistent with autistic individuals 
engaging in effortful over intuitive processing.  In the Future Research section, we outline a 
possible approach to clarifying whether such a predisposition is malleable.   
The fact the latency differences were relatively consistent across items suggests that 
consideration of response latencies may provide valuable information for clinicians trying to 
identify areas of difficulty for clients.  Given the relatively small sample sizes for the two 
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groups, the latency data presented in Tables 2 and 5 obviously cannot be regarded as 
normative data.  However, they do provide some potentially useful initial reference points for 
pinpointing areas of difficulty, even for individuals who respond correctly to an item. 
The self-awareness data provide the third contribution to our understanding of 
perspective taking limitations.  Despite being less confident than typically developing 
individuals when responding correctly—a not unexpected finding if processing is particularly 
effortful—the confidence-accuracy calibration curves for autistic individuals were 
characterized by more marked overconfidence than those of non-autistic individuals.  Lower 
accuracy and more marked overconfidence are consistent with what has often been referred to 
in the broader confidence-accuracy literature as the hard-easy effect, whereby the likelihood 
of overconfidence increases with task difficulty (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin et al., 
2000; Weber & Brewer, 2004).  Thus, at the group level, autistic individuals not only tended 
to be less accurate, slower and less confident, but were also less aware of when they were 
inaccurate.  The finding of reduced metacognitive awareness in autistic individuals is 
consistent with recent research suggesting that the accuracy of metacognitive judgments is 
dependent on perspective taking ability (Nicholson et al., 2021).  In Apperly and Butterfill’s 
two-system ToM framework, reduced metacognitive awareness would appear to correspond 
to a less efficient version of the cognitively flexible system which they suggest “enables 
adults to engage in top-down guidance of social interaction (such as anticipating what the 
audience of a lecture might know or working out how one misjudged the audience afterward)” 
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009, p. 996). 
One might speculate, therefore, that lower self-awareness would shape the individual’s 
processing, perhaps rendering them more hesitant in their decision making.  In other words, 
lower self-awareness would be a mechanism underpinning slower and more deliberative 
processing.  Some aspects of the data are, however, unable to be reconciled with this position.  
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For example, calibration curves characterized by under- rather than overconfidence might 
have been expected for the autistic group overall.  Underconfidence was also observed for 
those highly accurate individuals from both groups (see Figures 1 and 3, top panels), yet the 
highly accurate autistic individuals were still generally slower than the highly accurate non-
autistic individuals.  Most telling, however, was the finding that the calibration curves for fast 
and slow autistic decision makers on the social scale did not differ, suggesting an absence of 
any relationship between self-awareness and decision latency for perspective taking items. 
Indeed, the identical calibration curves for fast and slow autistic decision makers 
suggest the possibility that slower decision making was not a reflection of task difficulty 
constraining speed of responding.  If slow decision makers required the additional time to 
make their decision because the task was particularly difficult for them, we might expect the 
calibration curves to be consistent with a hard-easy effect, with slow individuals characterized 
by greater overconfidence.  We return to a consideration of whether slower decision making 
might reflect an adjustable (e.g., some kind of strategic) limitation when we consider issues 
for future research. 
The heterogeneity of the autistic sample was also highlighted by the calibration curves 
for those individuals from both groups who responded very accurately on the social scale.  
The curves for the two groups were virtually indistinguishable: both groups clearly knew they 
were accurate when they recorded 90-100% confidence but doubted themselves more than 
they should have when they expressed confidence in the 50-80% range.  One might be 
inclined to argue that this lack of confidence contributed to the slower responding of autistic 
individuals, but it does not explain why the non-autistic individuals were faster.  Indeed, it is 
generally considered that response latency, or ease of processing, is one of the important cues 
driving confidence assessments (e.g., Koriat & Ackerman, 2010; Semmler et al., 2004)—
with, for example, participants thinking, “that was easy, I solved it really quickly, I must be 
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right”—rather than the opposite.  Perhaps these data, coupled with the finding of lower 
overall confidence for the autistic individuals, is an indication that their longer latencies 
reflect a genuine processing difficulty.   
Finally, we note that, from a clinical perspective, a very easily obtained confidence 
assessment for the response to each item can provide an indication of whether the individual 
is aware of any limitations they might have (e.g., an incorrect response followed by a 
moderate-high confidence estimate) which might have broader implications for interpretation 
of self-report measures amongst autistic people.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Sample characteristics and reliability.  To secure autistic participant numbers, we 
collected an online sample to supplement our in-person sample.  This raises two issues.  First, 
for the online sub-sample, it meant we were reliant on participants’ self-reports to confirm 
they had received an ASD diagnosis, a practice that is potentially open to abuse. However, 
such was our questioning about details of the diagnosis that we believe it is most unlikely that 
people without a formal diagnosis took part (although the precise assessment procedures used 
in those diagnoses are, of course, unknown). Moreover, we re-emphasize two aspects of our 
data that give us some confidence in the integrity of our sample: (1) The markedly higher AQ-
10 scores for the online autistic individuals than for the non-autistic sample; and (2) The 
absence of any significant differences between the online and in-person autistic individuals on 
the A-ToM-Q sub-scales, the Strange Stories and the Frith-Happé animations.   
Second, the inability to administer the WASI-II to online participants meant the verbal 
ability measures for the two autistic sub-samples differed (i.e., WASI-II VCI vs. AVT).  Thus, 
it is possible that the online sample differed in verbal ability from the non-autistic sample.  
Confirming that the two samples were of equivalent verbal ability is obviously not possible, 
despite our exclusion of individuals who scored more than two standard deviations below the 
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normative sample mean on the AVT.  Nevertheless, given (a) the negligible correlations 
between the key measure of interest, the A-ToM-Q social scale, and both verbal ability 
measures (i.e., the WASI-II’s VCI and the AVT), and (b) performance on the social scale was 
independent of verbal ability, it seems unlikely that the differences we have reported between 
the autistic and non-autistic samples were IQ-related.  Nevertheless, replication of our 
findings with a consistent verbal ability measure across groups would be desirable.   
We emphasize that our controls for verbal ability do not rule out the possibility that 
there may be crucial language factors at play that undermine the interpretation of verbal (or 
written, in the case of the Strange Stories test) communications required in some ToM tasks 
(see, for example, Astington & Baird, 2005).  Sub-tests such as the vocabulary and 
similarities scales from formal tests of verbal ability clearly do not capture all the subtleties 
and complexities of either receptive or expressive language skills that may underpin how we 
interpret social communications from our interaction partners.  The precise nature of those 
factors and how they might have been shaped by the individual’s neuro-developmental history 
are questions our data do not address. 
Although Brewer et al. (2017) reported impressive test-retest reliability (r = .82) for the 
A-ToM social scale at intervals ranging from 2-83 weeks (M = 23.7 weeks), we were unable 
to collect test-retest data for the online sample.  Thus, future work gathering test-retest data on 
the A-TOM-Q would be desirable, bearing in mind that the intervening interval should be 
relatively long given the possibility that participants might recall forced-choice responses. 
Large sample sizes in studies such as this are desirable, especially to gain an 
appreciation of subtle variations that may be associated with factors such as gender, age, and 
degree of autistic traits.  (Note, for example, the impact of controlling for age on the decision 
latency outcomes.)  Another reason for large sample replication of our study is suggested by 
the latency data.  The descriptive latency statistics provide useful guidelines for clinicians 
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regarding possible perspective taking difficulties of examinees.  Given the inherent inter-
individual variability of latency measures, larger samples should ensure greater stability of 
those guidelines.  Useful benchmark latency data could be provided by a large (and easily 
obtainable) sample of non-autistic individuals, with subsequent identification of abnormally 
long response latencies from autistic examinees achievable by reference to the distributional 
characteristics of latencies from a large and diverse sample of non-autistic individuals. 
Other issues for future research.  We also suggest several other areas for future 
research.  First, issues already raised about the response latency data deserve attention if we 
are to understand fully the mechanisms underpinning perspective taking difficulties and, 
especially, the heterogeneous nature and extent of those difficulties.  Our data are consistent 
with the position that autistic individuals are less likely than non-autistic individuals to 
engage in intuitive processing and more likely predisposed towards deliberative or effortful 
processing (cf. Brosnan et al., 2016, 2017).  What is not clear is whether such a processing 
mode reflects a fixed constraint on decision latency, or might be controllable or manipulable 
by some kind of intervention.  Brosnan et al.’s conclusions were based on self-reports of 
processing mode preferences and performance on the Cognitive Reflections Test (CRT; 
Frederick, 2005).  That the adoption of a deliberative processing mode by autistic individuals 
in the Brosnan et al. studies was not ubiquitous leaves open the possibility that this may be an 
adjustable characteristic.  Indeed, Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) showed that, for non-
autistic individuals at least, it was possible to manipulate the processing mode employed by 
requiring rapid responses on a reasoning task.  How constraining deliberative processing 
affects performance on all decision-making tasks is an empirical question—and how autistic 
individuals are affected when deliberative processing is constrained on a perspective taking 
task also awaits empirical investigation. 
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One approach to clarifying this issue would be to measure A-ToM-Q social 
performance using a response-signal deadline procedure (cf. Brewer & Smith, 1990; Pachella 
& Fisher, 1989).  With a deadline procedure, participants are required to respond to the 
stimulus prior to a deadline.  By varying the deadline across trials or trial blocks (e.g., 1s, 2s, 
3s, 4s, 5s) a range of fast responses is produced, allowing the relationship between processing 
time and response accuracy to be determined empirically.  For example, if under a deadline 
procedure both autistic and non-autistic participants achieved asymptotic and equivalent 
accuracy at a 3s deadline, but their average response latencies under non-deadline conditions 
were 12s and 5s, respectively, the slower responding of the former group clearly does not 
reflect a processing capacity limitation.  If, however, the performance accuracy differential 
persisted at shorter deadlines, a more fundamental and non-adjustable limitation is likely.  We 
also note that, although deadline responding may reduce the accuracy differential, it might 
cause some discomfort for autistic individuals if incompatible with their preferred approach to 
a task.  Thus, it would be interesting to measure participants’ affective reactions when 
responding under deadline conditions, particularly given the practical implications this has for 
real-life contexts, ranging from everyday social interactions to employment interviews. 
Second, we note that although some research has examined the A-ToM’s criterion-
related validity (e.g., Young & Brewer, 2020), new research along similar lines would be 
extremely valuable if we are to unravel the relationships between individuals’ daily 
functioning and the nature and extent of perspective taking, or ToM, difficulties.  The 
capacity of the A-ToM-Q to supplement accuracy measures with latency and confidence 
measures offers potential for pinpointing specific processing difficulties, as well as problems 
at the metacognitive level that may constrain adaptive responding and future learning.  Just 
like the student who is blissfully unaware of their inadequate knowledge leading up to a test 
and, hence, does not study appropriately, so the individual who does not appreciate that they 
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are not ‘reading’ some of the subtle signals from their interaction partners is not only less 
likely to respond in a socially appropriate manner during interpersonal interactions, but is also 
likely to be ignorant of, and unlikely to explore, potentially beneficial avenues for social 
development. 
Third, we are mindful of the caveat previously expressed about the range of perspective 
taking behaviors tapped by the A-ToM (see, for example, Brewer et al., 2017).  The behaviors 
sampled by the A-ToM and, in turn, the A-ToM-Q, were based on an item analysis of a larger 
array of test items.  However, it is important to bear in mind that it is unlikely that the item set 
captures the range or indeed the extent of perspective taking difficulties that some autistic 
individuals may experience.  In other words, there is likely considerable scope for ongoing 
research into the nature and measurement of such difficulties. 
Fourth, like the A-ToM, the A-ToM-Q provides participants with explicit prompts to 
reflect on the behaviors observed in the videos, with the multiple-choice options providing 
additional structure for those reflections. Given previous demonstrations that autistic 
individuals may not spontaneously display ToM in the absence of specific prompts (e.g., 
Senju et al., 2009), it will be important to examine whether our measure, like various other 
measures of ToM, may overestimate the ability of some autistic individuals to apply ToM in 
real life tasks that will often lack such prompts. For example, how might autistic and non-
autistic individuals’ performance compare with a very general instruction such as “Please tell 
us what was going on in that scenario?” 
In sum, the A-ToM-Q’s social scale provides a tool to assess perspective taking 
difficulties far more rapidly than is possible with its predecessor, the A-ToM, and to obtain a 
more comprehensive picture by means of the access to latency and self-awareness data.  The 
availability of such measures offers benefits to researchers interested in elucidating the nature 
of the difficulties some autistic individuals may experience, as well as the potential for large-
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scale data collection because of its compatibility with web-based administration.  From a 
clinical perspective, the test stimuli depict realistic social interactions that are likely to be 
valuable for clinicians seeking to provide clients with specific examples that highlight the 
nuanced nature of interpersonal interactions.  In such contexts, responses that meet the 
“partially correct” criteria (see Supplemental Materials Table S1) may be informative for 
clinicians trying to pinpoint the nature of any difficulties that clients are experiencing.   
There are other obvious issues for future research. With respect to this particular 
measurement instrument it will be important to clarify issues such as the generality of 
particular difficulties highlighted by A-ToM-Q performance.  For example, are those 
difficulties alleviated in any way when there is a greater degree of contextual information 
available than is provided in the instrument’s test items, and will the heterogeneity of 
performance witnessed in participants in this study characterize individuals’ behavior across a 
broad range of perspective taking scenarios?  
A broader issue is the continued investigation of the optimal approaches for developing 
flexible and sustainable perspective taking skills in individuals who are experiencing 
difficulties. Although resolving this question is beyond the scope of this study—for detailed 
overviews see, for example, Brewer and Young (2015) and Fletcher-Watson et al. (2014)—
we very briefly highlight just some of the considerations involved. For example, should the 
focus be on trying to improve specific areas or dimensions of perspective taking or some 
broad or pervasive social-cognitive capacity? At what stage(s) of the individual’s 
development should the efforts be focused in order to maximize any benefits? How much and 
precisely what form of intervention will be necessary to promote maintenance of newly 
acquired skills and what special steps will be needed to ensure generalization or transfer of 
skills? It is also important to emphasize that, given well-developed ToM underpins much of 
our social interaction, being able to identify difficulties and subsequently ameliorate them can 
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potentially benefit a wider range of autistic individuals than we sampled in this study. For 
example, benefits for some non-verbal autistic individuals could be realized if future work can 
adapt instruments like the A-ToM-Q for use with such individuals. These are just some of the 
critical questions that researchers and clinicians will need to tackle—but first, of course, we 
need to be able to identify the nature and extent of any difficulties. 
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Appendix 
Example Scripts and Response Options for Social Items 
A-ToM Item:  Bunnies  Item Type:  Persuasion 
 
Two women sit in their living room discussing their bunnies: 
SUSIE: “So you know there is a lady coming over today to take a look at the rabbits.” 
MRS SMITH: “That’s good, because you know we can’t keep them all.” 
SUSIE: “I know.” 
 
She looks sad as she picks up one of the bunnies and cuddles it. 
SUSIE: “I just love them so much. I can’t bear the thought of anything bad happening to them. 
They’re just so beautiful and cuddly.” 
 
A girl approaches the house and knocks on the front door. The door opens to reveal woman 1 and 
woman 2: 
POTENTIAL BUYER: “Hi, I’m here to look at the bunnies.” 
SUSIE: “Of course, come inside.” 
Mrs Smith, Susie and the potential buyer are sitting in the living room. The potential buyer is cuddling 
one of the bunnies. 
POTENTIAL BUYER: “Oh they are all so cute. It’s a shame they’re all have males though, I was 
really looking for a female bunny.” 
SUSIE: “Oh that is a shame. You know if I can’t find a good home for them, I’m going to have to 
drown them.” 
 
Question to Participant: Why does she say she will have to drown the rabbits? 
 
Please answer each of the following questions as quickly and accurately as you possibly can. 
 
Why does she say she will have to drown the rabbits? 
a) She is trying to make the person feel guilty so they will buy one of the rabbits.  (correct) 
b) She is trying to get the girl to buy one.  (partially correct) 
c) She is unable to keep them all and if she can’t she will have to kill them.  (incorrect) 




A-ToM Item:  Party  Item Type:  Faux Pas 
 
Simon and Dave are standing in the corner of a party: 
SIMON: “So my brother knows the guy who owns this place.” 
DAVE: “That’s funny, my brother is the guy who owns this place.” 
They laugh together. 
SIMON: “Nice. I know this might be a bit forward, but I was wondering if I could grab your number?” 
DAVE: “Sure, but if you don’t mind, can you not tell anyone about it, as my father doesn’t know I’m 
gay. Only my brother knows.” 
SIMON: “Yeah that’s cool, I know it’s hard. My family knows but they seem pretty chill with it.” 
 
On the other side of the room Rob and Pete, are chatting to Dave’s Dad: 
ROB: “So, Mr Jones it looks like my brother and your son are really hitting it off. They make a cute 
couple.” 
PETE (trying to cover it up): “Ah... Rob did you watch that footy game last night?” 
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Dave’s dad ignores what Pete says: 
DAD (To Rob): “Sorry, ‘hitting it off’? What are you implying?” 
ROB (Realising what he has said) “Uh, nothing.” 
 
He turns and faces Pete: 
ROB: “Yeah, I saw the game! It was epic.” 
 
Question to Participant: Was there anything awkward or uncomfortable in this interaction? If so, what 
was it? 
a) Yes, the American has now let the father in on the secret that his brother and the man’s son are 
gay and the father clearly didn’t know.  (correct) 
b) Yes.  (partially correct) 
c) No, the American who knew his brother was gay was telling the father of the other boy that they 
made a cute couple.  (incorrect) 
d) No, the conversation appears quite reasonable and no-one appears uncomfortable.  (incorrect) 
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Table 1 
Decision latency descriptive statistics (in sec) for autistic and non-autistic groups on A-ToM-
Q social and physical items. 
 Autistic Non-autistic 
A-ToM-Q 
Item 
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median 
Social       
Bunnies       
Correct 12.37 8.98 9.53 6.18 3.69 5.05 
Incorrect 16.48 18.28 12.30 13.56 5.16 13.36 
Party       
Correct 19.78 9.88 17.29 12.86 10.00 9.77 
Incorrect 22.93 9.49 19.25 13.83 - 13.83 
Crying man       
Correct 9.47 6.06 7.65 5.24 5.20 3.44 
Incorrect 15.89 9.10 3.44 21.64 10.35 21.64 
Burglar       
Correct 13.06 8.40 10.36 7.22 5.40 5.36 
Incorrect 14.09 7.97 12.57 12.21 9.61 9.11 
Hat       
Correct 9.23 4.84 7.67 6.24 3.57 5.36 
Incorrect 9.03 4.90 7.41 7.79 5.36 6.83 
Spaghetti       
Correct 12.10 7.25 10.47 6.91 4.99 5.43 
Incorrect 15.79 9.29 11.51 8.76 4.35 7.54 
Physical       
Lightbulb       
Correct 9.12 6.34 7.11 7.17 4.47 6.04 
Incorrect 12.24 7.77 10.25 7.23 6.86 5.60 
Swimming       
Correct 7.14 3.81 6.02 4.95 2.71 4.37 
Incorrect 11.93 5.51 10.45 8.85 7.57 4.89 
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Glasses       
Correct 11.62 6.34 10.96 8.63 4.65 7.32 
Incorrect 15.61 7.63 12.29 12.14 8.45 8.31 
Car       
Correct 12.11 8.08 9.42 7.10 4.39 5.71 
Incorrect 12.90 6.54 11.26 12.08 7.34 9.48 
Leg injury       
Correct 10.39 5.56 8.62 6.80 3.50 6.22 
Incorrect 9.50 6.33 6.66 9.32 3.42 10.86 
Librarian       
Correct 10.27 4.96 9.93 6.50 3.45 6.30 
Incorrect 12.88 6.22 11.31 10.96 3.54 10.76 
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Table 2a 
Decision latency inferential statistics (in sec) for autistic versus non-autistic group contrasts 
on A-ToM-Q social and physical items. 
 Statistic 
Item/Response t Cohen’s d 95% CI around d 
Social    
Bunnies    
Correct t (94.67) = -5.33, p < .001 0.89 0.54, 1.24 
Incorrect t (33) = -.20, p = .846 0.07 -0.66, 0.80 
Party    
Correct t (152) = -4.31, p < .001 0.70 0.37, 1.02 
Incorrect t (15) = -.93, p = .367 0.96 -1.10, 2.99 
Crying man    
Correct t (142.29) = -4.54, p < .001 0.75 0.41, 1.08 
Incorrect t (22) = .85, p = .405 0.63 -0.84, 2.08 
Burglar    
Correct t (101.51) = -4.49, p < .001 0.82 0.44, 1.20 
Incorrect t (53) = -.77, p = .444 0.22 -0.34, 0.78 
Hat    
Correct t (102.62) = -3.80, p < .001 0.71 0.34, 1.08 
Incorrect t (51) = -.79, p = .432 0.25 -0.36, 0.86 
Spaghetti    
Correct t (113.42) = -4.77, p < .001 0.84 0.48, 1.20 
Incorrect t (29.44) = -3.18, p = .003 0.83 0.06, 1.59 
Physical    
Lightbulb    
Correct t (93) = -1.75, p = .084 0.36 -0.05, 0.77 
Incorrect t (74) = -2.74, p = .008 0.67 0.18, 1.16 
Swimming    
Correct t (146.62) = -4.14, p < .001 0.65 0.32, 0.98 
Incorrect t (17) = -1.01, p =.327 0.50 -0.49, 1.47 
Glasses    
Correct t (102) = -2.77, p = .007 0.55 0.15, 0.94 
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Incorrect t (65) = -1.58, p = .119 0.44 -0.12, 0.99 
Car    
Correct t (83.05) = -3.86, p < .001 0.75 0.33, 1.16 
Incorrect t (73) = -.51, p = .613 0.12 -0.34, 0.58 
Leg injury    
Correct t (109.29) = -4.32, p < .001 0.76 0.39, 1.13 
Incorrect t (46.84) = -.13, p = .896 0.03 -0.55, 0.61 
Librarian    
Correct t (97) = -4.23, p < .001 0.86 0.44, 1.27 
Incorrect t (61.87) = -1.64, p = .105 0.37 -0.10, 0.84 
*negative t statistic indicates longer latency for autistic than for non-autistic group 
 
Table 2b 
Decision latency descriptive statistics (in sec) and one-way ANCOVA inferential statistics, 
with age as a covariate, for autistic and non-autistic groups’ correct decisions on A-ToM-Q 
social and physical items.  
 Autistic Non-Autistic 
A-ToM-Q Item Adjusted 
Mean 
SE Adjusted Mean SE 
Social     
Bunnies 11.28 0.88 7.49 0.92 
 F (1, 132) = 7.61, p = .007, d = 0.48 
Party 18.12 1.15 14.25 1.20 
 F (1, 150) = 4.74, p = .031, d = 0.36 
Crying man 8.34 0.66 6.38 0.67 
 F (1, 144) = 3.83, p = .052, d = 0.33 
Burglar 11.95 1.00 8.21 1.03 
 F (1, 112) = 5.78, p = .018, d = 0.45 
Hat 9.01 0.61 6.44 0.59 
 F (1, 115) = 7.87, p = .006, d = 0.52 
Spaghetti 12.17 0.83 6.71 0.82 
 F (1, 127) = 19.27, p < .001, d = 0.78 
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Table 3 
Number of participants obtaining each score, and cumulative proportion ≤ each score, on the 
A-ToM social and physical scales for the autistic and non-autistic samples.  
Scale & Group Score 
Social 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Autistic        
Frequency 3 6 5 14 17 25 26 
ProportionCum 0.03 0.09 0.15 0.29 0.47 0.73 1.00 
Non-autistic        
Frequency 0 0 0 3 8 30 34 
ProportionCum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.55 1.00 
Physical        
Autistic        
Frequency 0 6 12 27 26 16 9 
ProportionCum 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.47 0.74 0.91 1.00 
Non-autistic        
Frequency 0 2 4 12 23 23 11 
ProportionCum 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.24 0.55 0.85 1.00 
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Table 4 
Decision latency descriptive statistics (in sec) and one-way ANCOVA inferential statistics 
(with age as a covariate) for autistic and non-autistic groups’ correct decisions on A-ToM-Q 
social and physical items for individuals with social scores of 5 or 6. 
 Autistic Non-Autistic 
A-ToM-Q Item Adjusted 
Mean 
SE Adjusted Mean SE 
Social     
Bunnies 10.36 0.91 7.28 0.80 
 F (1, 108) = 5.53, p = .021, d = 0.46 
Party 16.68 1.42 13.75 1.23 
 F (1, 111) = 2.05, p = .155, d = 0.27 
Crying man 7.27 0.87 6.31 0.74 
 F (1, 110) = 0.61, p = .438, d = 0.14 
Burglar 11.82 1.10 7.85 1.04 
 F (1, 92) = 5.70, p = .019, d = 0.50 
Hat 8.74 0.71 6.51 0.62 
 F (1, 99) = 4.70, p = .033, d = 0.44 
Spaghetti 10.19 0.93 6.76 0.79 
 F (1, 97) = 6.83, p = .010, d = 0.54 
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Figure 1.  Confidence-accuracy calibration curves for social (upper panel) and physical 
(lower panel) sub-scales, with number of observations for each plot point. 
A-TOM-Q SOCIAL (N=1206) 
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Supplemental Materials 
The A-ToM-Q:  A quick form of the Adult Theory of Mind (A-ToM) test 
Table S1.  
A-ToM-Q Forced-Choice Items 
Correct answer: green  (only these answers received 1 point in this study) 
Partially correct: blue  (0 points) 
Incorrect:  red  (0 points) 
Note:  The four forced-choice responses were randomly ordered, not as displayed below. 




Why does she say she will have to drown the rabbits? 
e) She is trying to make the person feel guilty so they will buy one of the rabbits. 
f) She is trying to get the girl to buy one. 
g) She is unable to keep them all and if she can’t she will have to kill them.  
h) She’s a horrible person who hates rabbits. 
 
Was there anything awkward or uncomfortable in this interaction? If so what was it? 
e) Yes, the American has now let the father in on the secret that his brother and the 
man’s son are gay and the father clearly didn’t know. 
f) Yes. 
g) No, the American who knew his brother was gay was telling the father of the other 
boy that they made a cute couple. 
h) No, the conversation appears quite reasonable and no-one appears uncomfortable. 
 
Why did the lady say "he is doing just fine”? 
a) The man is clearly not fine.  She is being sarcastic. 
b) The man is not fine but you don’t know why she said this. 
c) He may not be ok, but the woman has misunderstood.  
d) The woman is not interested in the man. 
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Why does the burglar give himself up? 
a) The burglar thought the policeman was calling out because he knew of the burglar’s 
wrong doing. 
b) The burglar thought he was being arrested.  
c) The burglar had a guilty conscience. 
d) The policeman had his glove. 
 
Why does she say she loves the hat? 
a) She told a white lie to spare the aunt’s feelings. 
b) She didn’t want to be rude. 
c) She thought it was the right thing to do. 
d) She really did like the hat. 
 
When the mother said ‘that meal must have filled you up’ did she mean it? If not, why did 
she say it? 
a) No, she was being sarcastic. 
b) Yes, the boy must have been quite full.  
c) No, but there is no reason for her to say this. 




Why does he buy the pack of 10? 
a) It was more economical. 
b) It was good to have some spare light bulbs. 
c) He will need more later. 
d) He likes that brand the best. 
 
Why did Harry win? 
a) Harry is better in the ocean.  
b) Harry is generally a better swimmer. 
c) Harry is older. 
d) Harry is male. 
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Why is the post office the most likely place to look? 
a) The post office was the last place where she was likely to use her glasses. 
b) The post office was where she left them. 
c) It was the last place she had been. 
d) The post office was the closest place to them. 
 
Why does he accept the dealer’s offer to pay in monthly instalments? 
a) Because his bank pays better interest than the dealer charges. 
b) He could save money. 
c) He thought it was the sensible thing to do. 
d) He can’t afford the whole thing. 
 
Why does she need an x-ray? 
a) There may be an injury to her leg and there is a need to see if she has broken anything.  
b) Because her leg is swollen. 
c) To see what’s wrong. 
d) It’s standard procedure. 
 
Why did Mrs Simpson put the book in a special room? 
a) The book is delicate and requires special handling to preserve it. 
b) The book is old. 
c) It is a special book. 
d) So she would always know where to find it. 
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Table S2 
Inter-correlations of A-ToM-Q scales with concurrent ToM measures 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. A-ToM-Q social - .39** .45** .40** .17* .28** 
2. A-ToM-Q physical  - .36** .37** .10 .22** 
3. Strange Stories social   - .61** .09 .31** 
4. Strange Stories physical    - .17* .36** 
5. Frith-Happé mental     - .79** 
6. Frith-Happé feelings      - 
 
*p < .05,  **p < .01 (2-tailed) 
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Table S3 
Descriptive statistics for the A-ToM-Q and the various concurrent, convergent and divergent 
validity measures for the autistic and non-autistic samples. 
 Group 
Scale Autistic 
(N = 96) 
Non-autistic 
(N = 75) 
A-ToM-Q Social   
Mean 4.24 5.27 
Standard deviation 1.65 0.81 
95% CIs 3.91 – 4.57 5.09 – 5.45 
Cohen’s d 0.76 
95% CIs around d 0.45 – 1.07 
A-ToM-Q Physical   
Mean 3.64 4.25 
Standard deviation 1.33 1.21 
95% CIs 3.37 – 3.91 3.98 – 4.52 
Cohen’s d 0.47 
95% CIs around d 0.16 – 0.78 
Concurrent Measures   
Strange Stories Social   
Mean 12.77 14.31 
Standard deviation 3.03 1.64 
95% CIs 12.16 – 13.38 13.93 – 14.69 
Cohen’s d 0.61 
95% CIs around d 0.30 – 0.92 
Inferential contrast t (148.57) = 4.23, p < .001 
Strange Stories Physical   
Mean 12.01 13.99 
Standard deviation 2.82 1.70 
95% CIs 11.44 – 12.58 13.60 – 14.38 
Cohen’s d 0.83 
95% CIs around d 0.51 – 1.14 
Inferential contrast t (158.14) = 5.65, p < .001 
Frith-Happé animations   
Random   
Mean 3.50 3.26 
Standard deviation 0.89 0.98 
95% CIs 3.32 – 3.68 3.03 – 3.49 
Cohen’s d 0.26 
95% CIs around d -0.04 – 0.56 
Inferential contrast t (168) = 1.69, p = .09 
Goal directed   
Mean 2.59 2.61 
Standard deviation 1.06 1.0 
95% CIs 2.38 – 2.80 2.38 – 2.84 
Cohen’s d 0.02 
95% CIs around d -0.28 – 0.32 
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Inferential contrast t (168) = 0.09, p = .93 
Mental   
Mean 2.53 2.96 
Standard deviation 1.33 1.14 
95% CIs 2.26 – 2.80 2.70 – 3.32 
Cohen’s d 0.34 
95% CIs around d 0.03 – 0.64 
Inferential contrast t (166.05) = 2.26, p < .05 
Feelings Categorization   
Mean 3.11 4.08 
Standard deviation 2.31 2.10 
95% CIs 2.65 – 3.57 3.59 – 4.57 
Cohen’s d 0.44 
95% CIs around d 0.13 – 0.75 
Inferential contrast t (168) = 2.82, p = < .01 
Convergent Measures   
Social Behavioral Skills   
Mean 3.69 3.97 
Standard deviation 0.40 0.35 
95% CIs 3.59 – 3.79 3.89 – 4.05 
Cohen’s d 0.75 
95% CIs around d 0.41 – 1.09 
Inferential contrast t (138) = 4.42, p < 001 
Interpersonal Relations   
Mean 3.80 4.32 
Standard deviation 0.64 0.44 
95% CIs 3.64 – 3.96 4.21 – 4.43 
Cohen’s d 0.97 
95% CIs around d 0.62 – 1.32 
Inferential contrast t (111.88) = 5.56, p < 001 
IRI Perspective Taking   
Mean 12.89 18.51 
Standard deviation 6.02 3.91 
95% CIs 11.67 – 14.11 17.61 – 19.41 
Cohen’s d 1.08 
95% CIs around d 0.76 – 1.41 
Inferential contrast t (163.93) = 7.37, p < 001 
IRI Empathic Concern   
Mean 17.26 17.35 
Standard deviation 5.59 2.88 
95% CIs 16.14 – 18.38 16.70 – 18.00 
Cohen’s d 0.02 
95% CIs around d -0.28 – 0.32 
Inferential contrast t (147.36) = 0.13, p = .90 
IRI Personal Distress   
Mean 14.83 12.36 
Standard deviation 5.24 4.63 
95% CIs 11.67 – 14.11 11.29 – 13.43 
Cohen’s d 0.50 
95% CIs around d 0.19 – 0.81 
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Inferential contrast t (169) = 3.22, p < .01 
Mini-SPIN   
Mean 7.70 5.81 
Standard deviation 3.15 2.51 
95% CIs 7.06 – 8.34 5.23 – 6.39 
Cohen’s d 0.65 
95% CIs around d 0.34 – 0.96 
Inferential contrast t (168.91) = 4.35, p < .001 
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Table S4 
Inter-correlations (rs) of A-ToM-Q individual social item latency z-scores 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Bunnies - .46** .50** .47** .49** .40** 
2. Party  - .49** .47** .44** .37** 
3. Crying man   - .40** .48** .43** 
4. Burglar    - .41** .41** 
5. Hat     - .29** 
6. Spaghetti      - 
 
*p < .05,  **p < .01 (2-tailed) 
 
Inter-correlations (rs) of A-ToM-Q individual physical item latency z-scores 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Lightbulb - .33** .30** .32** .34** .35** 
2. Swimming  - .24** .40** .40** .37** 
3. Glasses   - .29** .25** .32** 
4. Car    - .33** .43** 
5. Leg injury     - .45** 
6. Librarian      - 
 
*p < .05,  **p < .01 (2-tailed) 
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Figure S1.  Confidence-accuracy calibration curves for social (upper panel) and physical 
(lower panel) sub-scales for fast (filled square) and slow (unfilled square) autistic decision 
makers, with number observations for each plot point. 
A-ToM-Q SOCIAL, AUTISTIC (N=576) 
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Figure S2.  Confidence-accuracy calibration curves for social (upper panel) and physical 
(lower panel) sub-scales for individuals scoring 5 or 6 on the social sub-scale, with number 
observations for each plot point. 
 
A-TOM-Q SOCIAL (Scorers of 5 and 6 only, N=690) 
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